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Abstract
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has a policy framework for how clearing member banks should treat their
exposures to central counterparties (CCPs). Default funds play a crucial role as a risk mitigant in this framework. Furthermore,
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (together abbreviated as CPSS-IOSCO) produced a set of 26 principles for ﬁnancial market infrastructures. For a
CCP to be deemed a qualiﬁed CCP, it has to abide by these principles. Clearing member banks with trade exposures to a qualiﬁed
CCP will get preferential capital treatment under the BCBS framework. None of the principles or the policy framework requires,
or forces a CCP to have a default fund. However, regulators prefer CCPs to have default funds in place to enhance their credit risk
management practices, as required by principles 4 and 6 of the CPSS-IOSCO, before they will be qualiﬁed. We consider the merits
of the BCBS’s requirements for a clearing house, in a developing country such as South Africa, to become a qualiﬁed clearing
house and conclude that a CCP with prudent risk management processes and controls, should not be disqualiﬁed if a default fund
is not established.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organising Committee
of ICOAE 2014
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1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial market infrastructure of any country lies at the heart of that country’s ﬁnancial system. Central
counterparties (CCPs) form an integral part of the ﬁnancial market infrastructure. For this reason, central banks have
a long-standing interest in CCPs (see Rehlon and Nixon [20]). The importance of the ﬁnancial market infrastructure
is further stressed by the 26 principles set out by CPSS-IOSCO (see Kotze´ and Du Preez [6]).
A CCP is a clearing house which is positioned between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more ﬁnancial
markets. This structure insulates counterparties from each other’s default. Effective clearing mitigates systemic risk
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by lowering the likelihood that defaults propagate from counterparty to counterparty. A CCP has clearing members;
each clearing member has members and each member has clients. Kroszner [15] gives an overview of the history of
central clearing. Norman [18] provides an extensive coverage of CCPs.
Many CCPs have default funds, as there are obvious beneﬁts for a CCP to have a default fund. In the event of a
default occurring by one of the clearing members of a CCP, the CCP faces market risk. Under normal conditions,
the initial margin posted by the defaulting clearing member should cover the market risk that the CCP faces. Initial
margin, is the collateral to be deposited by a clearing member to the CCP to cover some or all of the credit risk of
counterparties to that clearing member. In stressed market conditions, this initial margin could be insufﬁcient and
the default fund is the next risk mitigant. The Basel III Accord provides guidelines on how to calculate the capital
requirements for default fund exposures.
The ﬁnancial crises of the past few decades contributed to stricter regulation of global ﬁnancial markets. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) contributes to this regulation by issuing recommendations, known as the
Basel Accords, to give direction to regulate the banking industry. However, the BCBS does not have the authority
to enforce these recommendations but they can be adopted by a country’s regulator, and the regulator then enforces
them.
Thus far, three Basel Accords, namely Basel I, Basel II and Basel III, have been issued. In the Basel III Accord
the BCBS made recommendations regarding the regulation of CCPs. One of the recommendations of the Basel III
Accord is that CCPs should become qualifying central counterparties by complying with the CPSS-IOSCO principles.
A qualiﬁed CCP is an entity that is authorised by a suitable regulator to operate as a CCP with respect to the products
and services that it offers. Regulators require CCPs to have default funds before qualifying them, as the BSBC
framework stresses the importance of a CCP’s mutualised loss sharing arrangements. A default fund forms an integral
part of a CCP’s loss bearing waterfall. Loss bearing waterfalls were put under the spotlight with the default of HanMag
Securities, a clearing member of the Korea Exchange (KRX). KRX has a default fund of $190 million. KRX’s risk
waterfall structure departs from the international standard as it puts non-defaulting members’ funds at risk before that
of its own capital. According to Vaghela [21], for the ﬁrst time in recent history, non-defaulting clearing members of
KRX were asked to top up millions of dollars in default fund contributions through no fault of their own.
Default of clearing members are rare events according to Kroszner [16]. Derivatives clearing houses successfully
weathered the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War as noted by Kroszner [15]. Even collapses
of major players like Barings during the 1990s and more recently Lehman Brothers and MF Global, did not bring any
CCP under threat of collapse as may be found in Kroszner[16] and Rehlon and Nixon [20].
There seems to be very little research available on default funds and their effect on the ﬁnancial system. This may
be ascribed to the recent emphasis of the Basel III Accord on CCPs and default funds. This research is an attempt to
help ﬁll this gap. In this paper, we consider the merits of the BCBS’s requirements for a CCP, in a developing country
such as South Africa, to become a qualiﬁed CCP.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we consider the history of default of clearing members of the
clearing house LCH.Clearnet. We note that in cases of default of its clearing members, losses were covered by initial
margin posted by the defaulting member. In section 3 we consider the CCP JSE Clearnet. This CCP recently qualiﬁed
under the Basel III Accord to become a qualiﬁed CCP. We argue that the combination of
• the current netting policy,
• the conservative requirements of the posting of initial margin, and
• the requirements of the BCBS for CCPs to become qualiﬁed CCPs
leads to a very small default fund. The latter, together with the fact that all clearing members are banks with very
large capital basis, makes a default fund superﬂuous and it inhibits the expansion of the market. Section 4 concludes
by making a case for a CCP with prudent risk management processes and controls, not to be disqualiﬁed if a default
fund is not established.
2. LCH.Clearnet
LCH.Clearnet Limited in the UK has an active default fund of nearly £700 million. It acts as a CCP for 15
exchanges/markets and currently has 161 clearing members. Its European operation, LCH.Clearnet SA has 104
clearing members operating in 24 markets. LCH.Clearnet LLC clears swaps in the USA and currently has 15 clearing
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members. Lehman Brothers and MF Global were two of its largest clearing members.
Quarry et al. [19] studied the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and considered the way that LCH.Clearnet
handled the situation as an advertisement for central clearing. Fig. 1 shows the impact of Lehman Brothers’ failure on
the CCP. From Fig. 1, it is clear where a default fund ﬁts into the layer of risk management, which is also known as
the loss bearing waterfall. Lehman Brothers had enough initial margin on deposit from its member brokers to cover
this risky situation: this is reﬂected by the shaded region in Fig. 1. The default fund of LCH.Clearnet Limited was not
impacted at all by the default of Lehman Brothers.
Fig. 1. Impact of the Lehman Brothers failure on LCH.CLEARNET, a clearinghouse, as extracted from Quarry et al.
[19]
MF Global was an LCH.Clearnet clearing member as well. When it defaulted in 2011, its initial margin was also
enough to cover the stressed market conditions and the default fund of LCH.Clearnet Limited was not impacted.
LCH.Clearnet had 8 clearing member failures since 1990. Table 1 shows the history of default of its clearing
members. It also shows that, in each case, the initial margin was sufﬁcient to cover potential losses and there was no
need to draw funds from the default fund.
Table 1. LCH.Clearnet’s clearing member default history (Source: [17])
Name of clearing member Year of default Losses
Drexel, Burnham, Lambert 1990 sufﬁcient initial margin
Woodhouse, Drake and Carey 1991 sufﬁcient initial margin
Barings 1995 sufﬁcient initial margin
Grifﬁn 1998 sufﬁcient initial margin
Lehman Brothers 2008 sufﬁcient initial margin
MF Global UK Ltd 2011 sufﬁcient initial margin
Cyprus Popular Bank Co Ltd 2013 sufﬁcient initial margin
Both Lehman Brothers and MF Global were clearing members of the Euronext Group in Europe. Again, both
defaults were handled without much market disruption and without the default fund being touched.
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3. JSE Clear: The South African CCP
South Africa’s only clearing house is called JSE Clear (it was previously known as SAFCOM) and it is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the JSE. JSE Clear established its default fund during March 2013 and the size of its default
fund is R500 million (about $50 million). The larger clearing members contribute more to the fund and JSE Clear
contributes R100 million (20%) to the fund - it has “skin in the game.” There are 10 clearing members, all of which
are either local or international banks. The largest general clearers are Rand Merchant Bank (part of the FirstRand
Group), Standard Bank and Absa Bank (part of Barclays PLC).
Regulations regarding netting in South Africa appears to be different from many other countries. A netting agree-
ment is a contract between counterparties which, in the event of default, allows aggregation of transactions between
the counterparties. This means that transactions with negative value can be used to offset the ones with positive value
and only the net positive value represent credit exposure at the time of default (see Zhu and Pykhtin [22]).
In South African netting is also known as offsetting. The portfolio scanning margining methodology used when
trading derivatives on the JSE allows for limited offsetting. Offsetting is only allowed on a client basis and only for
certain groups of instruments. In many countries, netting is allowed on a wider basis provided that there are bilateral
contracts in place between different clients or members of a particular clearing member. However, this is not currently
allowed in South Africa.
The South African derivatives market is grouped into 4 segments/markets: equity derivatives, commodity deriva-
tives, interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange derivatives. The types of instruments cleared per market is shown
in Table 2.
Table 2. Derivative instruments cleared by JSE Clear (Source: [7])
Market Instrument types
Equity Derivatives Index and single name futures; vanilla options on these futures; Variance futures;
Quanto options and futures; Exotic options like Barriers, Digitals, Asians and
LookBacks; Structured trades like Zero Cost Collars, Fences, Ladders and Timers
Commodity Derivatives Options and Futures on Maize, Soya, Sunﬂower, Wheat and Sorghum; Quanto options
and futures on Gold, Platinum, Copper, Silver, Heating Oil, Gasoline, Coffee and Cotton
FX Derivatives Options and futures on USDZAR, GBPZAR, EURZAR, JPYZAR, AUSZAR,
CADZAR, CFRZAR, RMBZAR; Quantos on EURUSD; Futures on the Rand Index;
Exotics like Barriers and Digitals on USDZAR mostly
Interest Rate Derivatives Options and futures on government debt and State-owned company debt;
Jibar futures (similar to Libor futures) and Swap futures
In South Africa, estimates of the size of initial margin per derivative instrument are conservative, and offset between
different instruments are limited. Offsets between the different markets shown in Table 2 are further not allowed. This
results in relatively high initial margin posted by clients.
At the time of its default, Lehman Brothers was the largest participant in the exchange traded derivatives market in
South Africa. Lehman Brothers, however, was not a clearing member of the clearing house, JSE Clear.
Prior to their default in 2008, Lehman Brothers traded in equity, currency and interest rate derivatives in South
Africa. It also had many exotic instruments, structured trades and variance futures on its book — these were traded on
the Can-Do platform of the JSE. This is a platform where bespoke trades are listed, margined and cleared (see [8, 9]).
The whole book was transferred to its clearing member within forty eight hours and surplus initial margin returned to
the curators. No counterparty (broking member or client) had any losses due to this default. Lehman Brothers’ initial
margin on deposit was more than adequate to cover losses.
3.1. The hypothetical capital requirement for a CCP
One of the Basel III Accord requirements for a CCP to become a qualiﬁed CCP is the calculation of “hypothetical
capital”, denoted by KCCP, due to the CCPs counterparty credit risk to all of its clearing members. For this, the BCBS
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Fig. 2. JSE Clear total initial margin on deposit (Source: [7])
speciﬁes the use of the formula (see BCBS [1, 2] and Kotze´ and Du Preez [14])
KCCP =
N
∑
i=1
max{EBRMi− IMi−DFi,0} ·RW ·CR, (1)
where
• N is the number of clearing members;
• EBRMi denotes the CCP’s exposure value to clearing member i before risk mitigation;
• IMi is the initial margin posted by clearing member i;
• DFi is the prefunded default fund contribution by clearing member i that will be applied upon such a clearing
member’s default;
• RW is a risk weight of 20% (this is a minimum requirement and can be increased by the national supervisor); and
• CR is the capital ratio with a minimum requirement of 8%.
The BCBS, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have now completed their work on the capital treatment of bank exposures to
central counterparties [5]. Equation 1 is an interim rule that will hold until 31 December 2016. From 1 January 2017
a clearing member’s exposures to clients should be calculated using the Internal Models Method or the Standardised
Approach for counterparty credit risk. A clearing member’s exposure to the default fund should then be calculated
using the Standardised Approach for counterparty credit risk method.
3.2. An intuitive estimate of the size of KCCP for the CCP JSE Clear
A small hypothetical capital is beneﬁcial to the CCP and clearing members. Thus, for KCCP to be small,
max{EBRMi− IMi−DFi,0}
has to be small for each i. This will be the case, if EBRMi− IMi−DFi is negative, zero or a small positive number for
each i.
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As initial margin requirements for clearing members of JSE Clear are conservative (and therefore relatively high),
the value of IMi in equation 1 for any ﬁxed i, is expected to be relatively high. On the other hand, netting is limited,
which means that the value of EBRMi is expected to be relatively high as well. Thus,
• if EBRMi− IMi is large, then DFi has to be large,
• if EBRMi− IMi is small, then DFi has to be small,
for EBRMi− IMi−DFi to be negative, zero or a small positive value.
To decide if the size of the default fund under the Basel III Accord is expected to be small or large, the value of
EBRMi− IMi has to be investigated.
Under the interim rules, the BCBS forces a CCP to use the current exposure method (CEM) to estimate its credit
exposures (ERBM) to clearing members [2]. For an extensive discussion on the current exposure method, the reader
is referred to Kotze´ and Du Preez [14].
By using the current exposure method and trade data supplied by JSE Clear, it is possible to estimate ERBM and to
plot initial margin versus ERBM as indicated in Fig. 3 (the details will not be presented here due to a lack of space).
See Table 2 for a summary of the type of instruments traded on the JSE and cleared by JSE Clear.
Fig. 3. EBRM in equation (1) versus the initial margin on deposit at JSE Clear. Also plotted are the positive values of
EBRMi− IMi as shown by the diamonds
Fig. 3 answers the question regarding the value of EBRMi− IMi: it shows that the initial margins are mostly higher
than the exposure values. The result is that a positive EBRMi − IMi is rare as depicted by the relative few diamonds
shown. This means that the expected default fund is small.
3.3. Estimating the size of a default fund for JSE Clear under the Basel III Accord
By using the current exposure method and trade data supplied by the JSE, it is further possible to estimate the size
of a default for JSE Clear as indicated in Fig. 4 (again, the details will not be presented here due to a lack of space).
Fig. 4 shows the daily optimised default fund and hypothetical capital since September 2009. We observe that
the default fund size is quite volatile, ranging from zero to nearly R150 million (the largest value is not shown and
is treated as an anomaly). We thus smooth these values by taking a 3 month average. This is also shown. The graph
shows that the default fund is quite small and was nearly zero for most of 2010 and very small towards the latter part
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of 2013. One can see some very volatile periods during 2011 and 2012. The desired fund size is thus somewhere
between zero and R150 million.
Fig. 4. Default fund by optimising the CEM. Shown are the daily values and those values smoothed by a 3 month
average.
3.4. The dilemma of investing the default fund
Currently JSE Clear accepts only cash as collateral and the fund is managed by the JSE under mandate from JSE
Clear. These funds are invested in the South African money market, i.e. invested with the same banks the default fund
has to be a buffer against when a clearing member defaults.
The investment policy of the JSE requires that the default fund contribution of a particular clearing member (which
is a bank) has to be invested with the other banks (which are also clearing members). This is of course consistent with
the current policy that no netting is allowed.
3.5. The inﬂuence of a default fund on stemming systemic risk
Saambou Bank was South Africa’s seventh largest bank, but not a clearing member of SAFCOM (now JSE Clear),
before its collapse during February 2002. It collapsed after investors lost conﬁdence and withdrew more than R1
billion of their savings. This was South Africa’s largest ever bank collapse and caused serious systemic risk.
According to Hawkins [12], Fitch SA, a rating agency, downgraded six other similar rated banks. The South
African Reserve Bank intervened and requested Fitch SA to reconsider its rating in the hope of restoring conﬁdence
in the system. BOE, South Africa’s sixth largest bank at the time, was also affected, as clients lost conﬁdence in
small banks. Investec Bank, then South Africa’s ﬁfth largest banking group, had a 40% stake in Saambou. The
Saambou Bank collapse had dire consequences for Investec Bank and a run on the bank started to manifest. Regulators
intervened and the South African Reserve Bank undertook to honour clients’ demands for funds and approved the
takeover of BOE by NEDCOR.
Intervention of the South African Reserve Bank stemmed the tide of systemic risk which resulted from the collapse
of Saambou Bank.
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At present, the exposure to derivatives in South Africa is less that R500 billion, while the total banking sector has
assets in the region of R3.5 trillion. The ratio of derivative exposure to bank capital is thus very low.
An empirical estimate, which uses the requirements of the Basel III Accord, shows that a default fund of R150
million rand for JSE Clear (during September 2009 to September 2013) sufﬁces, which is a small number.
The banking sector in South Africa is relatively small. Currently, the South African banking industry consists of
17 registered banks, 2 mutual banks, 12 local branches of foreign banks, and 41 foreign banks with approved local
representative ofﬁces. It contributes 10.5% to the Gross Domestic Product and its tax bill amounts to over 15% of
total government’s tax income. If one of the major clearing banks should default, the South African Reserve Bank
will be forced to intervene to prevent the knock-on effects of systemic risk and the possible meltdown of the economy.
This intervention is independent of the existence or the non-existence of a default fund of JSE Clear.
4. To qualify or not to qualify, or to change the rules and qualify
In a developing country such as South Africa, the Basel III requirements for a CCP to have a default fund to become
a qualiﬁed CCP, could be interpreted to be a misguided attempt to manage risk and could have dire consequences for
the ﬁnancial sector.
From the arguments presented above, there is a strong case to be made that a default fund for JSE Clear is not
necessary. But, if JSE Clear does not have a default fund, it cannot be a qualiﬁed CCP. If a CCP is not a qualiﬁed
CCP, the capital charges enforced by the Basel III Accord is such that it is conceivable that no bank would want to
participate in the derivatives market and the whole market could cease to exist.
The South African derivatives market is relatively small by international standards. Many developing and frontier
countries are in the process of establishing new CCPs and derivatives markets. Two of the most recent CCPs is the one
established by the Nairobi Stock Exchange in Kenya and the Bonds and Derivatives Exchange in Lusaka, Zambia.
Default funds add to the cost of trading. According to our analysis, under similar rules to those in South Africa,
default fund for these new CCPs are superﬂuous. Moreover, idle default fund cash hampers the growth of the ﬁnancial
services sector.
Default funds could be replaced by appropriate private insurance which could be used to cover the loss from default
by clearing members (see Jones and Pe´rignon [13]).
For a CCP to become a qualiﬁed CCP, the focus should not only be on the total level of ﬁnancial resources available
to a CCP (see [5]), but also on sound risk management procedures of a CCP.
The fact that the default of Lehman Brothers did not impact on the default fund of LCH.Clear, has to be ascribed
to the sound risk management procedures that LCH.Clear had in place prior to the default. At the time, JSE Clear did
not have a default fund and its clearing members did not suffer losses, again because of the sound risk management
procedures that JSE Clear had in place. The same can be said of the MF Global default where no default fund was
impacted by its demise. The default of HanMag Securities during December 2013 on KRX should not be seen as
proof that default funds are necessary. If KRX had prudent risk management processes and an international accepted
risk waterfall, the default could have been avoided or settled without impact on its default fund (see Vaghela [21]).
Qualiﬁcation of a CCP by its regulator should also depend on factors such as transparent and prudent risk man-
agement practices, how the various risk management instruments are combined and what kind of incentives they
create (see Haene and Sturm [11] in this regard). Furthermore, the interoperability of CCPs will have beneﬁts of joint
clearing and that can in principle reduce counterparty risk signiﬁcantly, according to Dufﬁe and Zhu [10].
A CCP with prudent risk management processes and controls, should not be disqualiﬁed if a default fund is not
established.
The dilemma of a central counterparty versus a qualiﬁed central counterparty in a developing country could easily
be resolved by changing the requirements for qualiﬁcation in a sensible way to include risk management.
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